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Abstract  
This article analyses how a latecomer firm facing adverse economic and policy conditions 
might still be able to build up enough technological capabilities to catch up with global 
competitors in renewable energy systems.  Drawing on catch up theory and evolutionary 
economics, we conduct an in-depth case study of an unusually successful firm from 
Argentina over a 40 year period. The research indicates that the gradual and coherent 
formation of ‘contrarian’ technological capabilities eventually pays off in the long term. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Conventional wisdom suggests that developing countries are mostly importers of high 
technology capital goods because they lack the required capabilities to produce them locally 
(Vernon 1966, Rosenberg 1976, Bell & Pavitt 1993). However, there is growing evidence of 
successful, innovative firms emerging from developing countries, although they tend to 
focus on low-to-medium technologies such as consumer goods and commodities (Dunning 
et al. 1998, Chudnovsky et al. 1999, Amann & Cantwell 2012; Dahlman and Ross-Larson 
1987, Amsden 1989, World Bank 1993).  
Firm-level (or ‘latecomer firm’ ) studies have tended to focus on the capability-building 
process of exporting companies in fast growing economies (Kim 1997, Figueiredo 2002, 
Matthews 2006).  Unsurprisingly, very little attention has been paid to the case of 
successful capability building in declining and/or crisis-ridden economies. By definition, 
successful exporting firms would be rare exceptions running counter to the general 
tendencies associated with decline and crisis. However, if we were able to identify 
outstanding latecomer firms and examine successful capability-building processes under 
adverse circumstances, they could perhaps provide policy insights and even strategic 
lessons for the many less successful firms in these countries.   
Argentina is an economy which has suffered considerable and prolonged periods of 
macroeconomic turbulence and phases of extreme decline in its industrial base as well as 
technological capabilities over the past 40 years  (Schvarzer 2000, Katz 2006). As a result, it 
is rather unusual to find innovative exporting firms that have succeed over long periods of 
time, especially in the internationally competitive capital goods market. Nevertheless, as we 
show below, one latecomer firm  from Argentina appears to have built the required 
capabilities to become an international leader in the production of sophisticated capital 
goods, namely wind & hydroelectric systems.   
The purpose of this paper is to examine the capability-building process of one specific, 
highly successful, Argentinian latecomer firm as it contended with a hostile macroeconomic 
and policy environment in order to assess the reasons for its survival, growth, 
innovativeness and catch up with international leaders. The paper focuses on the firm’s  
acquisition, development, and nature of technological capabilities (Bell & Pavitt, 1993, 
1995) and, secondarily, the organizational capabilities and structures associated with them 
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(Dosi, Nelson, & Winter, 2001). The emergence of other latecomer capabilities that might be 
contingent to the adverse context is also explored and discussed. The paper also develops 
an analytical framework for research capability building in emerging or developing 
economies. 
The conceptual framework of this article draws upon the contributions of Gerschenkron 
(1962) on economic development and more recent firm-level research on latecomer 
capability building (Kim, 1997; Dutrenit, 2004; Matthews, 2006; Amann & Cantwell, 2012; 
Figuereido, 2003; Kiamehr et al, 2013). We also utilise the evolutionary economics studies 
which analyse firm’s differences in capability-building (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Nelson, 
1991; Dosi et al, 2010; and Teece et al, 1994). 
The conceptual aim is to couple elements of latecomer capability development and 
evolutionary economics to propose a simple framework for studying latecomer firm 
capability development under adverse conditions.  
We propose that certain latecomers that face unfavourable external conditions might still 
be able to build up the required capabilities to catch up, as a result of firm diversity, 
strategic discretion, heterogeneous response and ultimately the contrarian path followed 
by the firm itself.  
To place the case examination in context, the paper characterises the macroeconomic, 
industrial and institutional conditions which confronted firms in Argentina across different 
policy regimes over the past 40 years (1970s-2010s) as the country experienced a general 
economic decline. The core of the paper is based on a detailed case study of IMPSA 
(Industrias Metalurgicas Pescarmona Sociedad Anonima: in Spanish), a latecomer firm that 
became a world-leading manufacturer of high-tech capital goods and more recently a 
leading provider of integrated solutions1 for power generation from renewable resources 
(e.g. wind & hydroelectric turbines).  
A single case study is adopted as, according to Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (2009), this 
method is well suited for examining unusual phenomenon because they allow an in-depth 
investigation into processes such as capability building and allow analysis of contrasting 
results (e.g. individual firm success in the context of general failure). Also, specifically in the 
field of evolutionary economics, Nelson (2008) emphasizes the importance of using detailed 
                                                          
1 See Galbraith (2002) and Davies (2004) for a definition. 
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firm case studies to better understand why firms differ and how it matters for industrial 
development. Finally, the conclusion attempts to provide government policy and strategy 
implications for capability-building in other firms and countries facing adverse conditions.  
Our approach combines historical analysis of the policy regimes in Argentina with 
qualitative characterisation of the firm’s capability-building process, complemented by 
several quantitative measures of its performance (e.g. sales, exports, profitability, 
innovation, etc.) over time. Data for the case study are based mainly on internal 
documentation (e.g.: company’s balance sheets, annual reports, and financial statements) 
and unique archival records comprising more than 250 newspaper articles (selected out of 
400,000) that made references to IMPSA (and the affiliates companies) between 1979 and 
2012, including full interviews with firm representative conducted by third parties, 
covering most of the topics of interest. These recorded interviews emerged as highly 
relevant as they included original and real time insights from the company’s founder as well 
as various CEOs and key directors over a period of nearly 40 years. 
The main contribution of the paper is a detailed explanation of the acquisition, development 
and accumulation of technological capabilities, also touching on associated organizational 
capabilities and the strategies underpinning them. The paper also contributes a simple 
analytical framework to integrate the micro-level factors that enabled the firm to build the 
technological capabilities to overcome macro-level economic disincentives and policy 
disadvantages. We hope that the analysis of this contrarian capability path will contribute 
to studies of latecomer firm catch up, showing how firms may adopt heterogeneous 
responses to policy.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Part 2 presents the analytical framework and 
includes the literature review, the analysis of the Argentine context as well as the 
description of data and methodology. Part 3 summarizes the evidence from the case study 
and discusses the empirical findings. Part 4 draws conclusions and discusses potential 
implications. 
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2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1 Aim 
The aim of this section is to couple elements of latecomer development theory and 
evolutionary economics to show how latecomer firms facing unfavourable macroeconomic 
and policy conditions might still have sufficient ‘strategic room for manoeuvre’ to catch up, 
as a result of firm diversity, heterogeneous response and the building-up of distinctive 
technological capabilities. Section 2.2 summarises the literature on latecomer development 
theory (macro-level); Section 2.3 contextualizes the latecomer disadvantages for the 
specific case of Argentina. Section 2.4 briefly examines micro-level latecomer firm theory 
and evolutionary economic theory depicting different levels of heterogeneity. Section 2.5 
describes the data used and research methods employed throughout. Finally, in Section 2.6, 
a simple macro-micro analytical framework is presented as a device to guide the empirical 
analysis of Part 3.  
 
2.2 Latecomer disadvantages (macro-level) 
Since the late 1950s, many scholars have focused on catching-up processes at the country 
level, utilising a variety of theoretical and historical models (Hirschmann, 1958; Rostow, 
1960; Gerschenkron, 1962), as well as empirical investigations (Baumol, 1986; De Long, 
1987; Maddison, 1995) and notable studies of successful East and Southeast Asian 
economies (Dahlman, Ross-Larson & Westphal, 1987; Amsden, 1989, 2001; World Bank, 
1993; Lee & Lim, 2001) including industry level studies (Mathews & Cho, 2000; Malerba & 
Nelson, 2011) and firm level studies (Kim, 1997; Figueiredo, 2002, 2003; Dutrenit, 2004; 
Mathews, 2006; Gao, 2014).  
Gerschenkron (1962), in particular, highlights the heterogeneous and specific set of what he 
called ‘missing preconditions’ that each latecomer country would need to acquire in order 
to catch up. These preconditions could comprise new institutions, market mechanisms and 
technologies for catching up, in line with each country’s own stage of backwardness, 
resources and opportunities. For instance, based on a study of the electronics industry in 
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the Asian newly industrializing economies, Hobday (1995) identified two set of latecomer 
disadvantages: 
Technological disadvantages. Based in a developing country, firms face a latecomer context 
of dislocation from the most important world sources of science, technology, R&D, design 
engineering and technical skills.  
Market disadvantages. Latecomer firms face restricted access to international markets and 
sophisticated users and are therefore dislocated from mainstream global markets and 
usually serve small and underdeveloped markets at home. 
As well as disadvantages, latecomers may also have advantages over developed economies. 
As Gerschenkron (1962) points out, advantages may include low cost labour, land and 
capital and the potential for importing technology to catch up, providing nations with 
distinctive pathways for overcoming their disadvantages.  
 
2.3 The Argentine context 
Over a period of more than 40 years (circa 1890 to 1930) Argentina recorded one of the 
world’s highest annual growth rates in terms of per capita GDP. While highly industrialized 
countries such as the US and the UK grew at an annual rate of 1.5 % and 0.7 %, respectively, 
Argentina’s per capita GDP grew at an average annual rate of 1.6 %2. As a result, by 1908 
Argentina had become the 7th richest nation (in per capita income terms), well ahead of 
other Latin America countries and ahead of many industrialized nations, such as Japan, 
Germany, France and Italy. However, by 2008, Argentina’s GDP per capita had fallen behind 
dramatically and its ranking fell to 64th in levels of per capita GDP3.  
Argentina represents a striking case of ‘falling behind’4 on the world stage, deteriorating 
economically from a rapidly developing nation to a crisis ridden underdeveloped nation5.  
Different policy regimes in Argentina were associated with specific latecomer 
disadvantages over the past 50 years, jeopardizing the prospects of firms to catch up.  
These regimes followed, in general, the lines of those observed in other Latin American 
nations, although with some local specificities which, in Argentina’s case, further 
                                                          
2 Calculations based on Maddison (1995). 
3 See United Nations Statistical Division (2013) 
4 Abramovitz (1986) 
5 See Lewis (1978), Samuelson (1980), Schvarzer (1995b), Della Paolera & Gallo (2003), De Pablo (2006). 
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exacerbated the negative outcomes. Policy regimes can be grouped into five time periods6 
as follows (i) import substitution industrialization (ISI), between mid-1950s and 1975; (ii) 
economic and financial liberalization imposed by a military coup d’etat between 1976 and 
1983; (iii) return to democracy but with an inherited foreign debt crisis and 
macroeconomic instability between 1983 and 19897; (iv) economic, trade, and financial 
liberalization recommended by the World Bank and other international financial agencies 
(usually termed ‘Washington Consensus’ policies) between 1990 and 2001; (iv) economic 
recovery and new ISI policy regime between 2002 and the present time. Until 2002, each 
policy regime brought with it severe episodes of economic, political and, often, social crises 
(e.g. 1975, 1982, 1989 and 2001) and a seemingly endless series of economic downturns 
followed by partial recoveries89.  
One of the distinctive characteristics of the policy regimes observed in Argentina was the 
constant swing of orientation from left- to right-wing politics and vice versa. The latter 
usually emphasized Argentina’s static comparative advantages (i.e. natural resource 
exports) while the former attempted to promote industrialization by protective means. 
These lurches from policy to policy hampered the country’s potential to catch up and 
provided an unpredictable and hostile environment for firms. In addition, the policy 
regimes failed to enable the economy to overcome the two core latecomer disadvantages 
noted above.  
Market dislocation. The protectionist nature of Argentina’s ISI policy regime did not 
incentivize industrial exports due to protected domestic markets, leading to continuing 
dislocation from global markets. The economic and trade liberalization policies abruptly 
initiated by the military following the coup d’etat in 1976, and further consolidated during 
the 1990s, did enable a greater engagement with global markets. However, this was not 
characterised by industrial catching up (Schvarzer, 2000) but, rather, the export of basic 
commodities (Katz, 1999) following the static comparative advantage emphasis of 
                                                          
6 For further discussion about specific periods see Prebisch (1950), Fajnzylber (1984), Williamson (1990), ECLAC 
(1996), Chisari, Fanelli, & Frenkel (1996), Katz (2000, 2001), Schvarzer (2000, 2002) and Katz & Bernat (2011, 
2013). 
7 This period is widely regarded by the Latin American literature as the ‘lost decade’ (ECLAC, 1996) 
8 Braun & Joy (1981) termed this macroeconomic process as ‘stop and go’ cycles. 
9 At the time of writing, Argentine economy seemed to be returning to ‘stagflation’ (i.e. a combination of stagnation 
and inflation) which could indicate the beginning of a new economic crisis and the end of the current policy regime 
(general elections are due in 2015). See The Institute for New Economic Thinking Blog on July 31, 2014; and the 
online newspaper Perfil.com on April 26, 2014). 
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Washington Consensus’ policies. The more recent ISI regime also failed to succeed in 
incentivizing, for instance, the exports of high-tech industrial goods (Katz & Bernat, 2011, 
2013). Indeed, a common feature of each policy regime has been to discourage high 
technology industrial firms to engage with and exploit technology-based export markets 
(e.g. as occurred in the case of Asian Industrialization).  
Technological dislocation. While ISI had encouraged a gradual development of domestic 
technological capabilities, these had been largely ‘cut off’ from the international economy. 
Conversely, new state-of-the-art foreign technologies (mostly imported machinery & 
equipment during the 1990s) did modernize the country’s production capacities in a few 
sectors of the economy (i.e. mostly services-related) but to the detriment of the local 
generation of indigenous technological capabilities (Katz, 2000). For instance, in the case of 
the automotive sector, Cimoli and Katz (2002:7-8) explain that ‘launching the Ford Taunus 
to the Argentine market in 1974 demanded some 300 thousand hours of domestic 
engineering efforts carried out by a local team of 120 professionals employed by Ford’s 
Engineering Department… Domestic content for the car was close to 90% of the total value 
of the vehicle’. However, under the subsequent economic liberalization regimes, the 
growing domestic technological capabilities of Ford Argentina and its dense industrial 
network of metalworking suppliers and specialized subcontractors declined along with its 
local R&D labs and project-engineering departments. Responding to these policy regimes, 
the company cut back its technological investments and concentrated on assembling 
imported parts and components to produce standard cars with little or no technological 
content (Schvarzer, Rojas-Breu, & Papa, 2003). As noted above, in the 1990s many local 
firms responded to the Washington consensus policies by shifting from local learning of 
technology under ISI to importing high technology production capacity with little 
investment in the capabilities needed to improve upon the imported technology as 
occurred, for example, in the Asian success cases.10  
Other disadvantages compounded the market and technological difficulties facing local and 
foreign firms in Argentina. The first can be termed macroeconomic adversity. During the 
extreme shifts in policy, Argentina suffered from a high degree of macroeconomic and 
                                                          
10 In Bell and Pavitt’s terminology (1993) this amounted to a building up of ‘production capacity’ but a failure to 
build ‘technological capability’. 
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institutional instability11, both of which gravely affected the long-term prospects of firms’ 
ability to catch up (Fanelli & Frenkel, 1994; Schvarzer, 1995b; De Pablo, 2006). Multiple 
economic crises negatively impacted the investment and innovative strategies of firms, as 
prolonged exposure to episodes of market turbulence (including both prices and demand) 
induced ‘short-termism’ and a lack of the gradual capability building required to enable 
firms to compete internationally. Many firms also downsized or exited within declining 
industries. Indeed, the sudden opening-up to foreign competition, coupled with the initial 
appreciation of local currency, led to an estimated 15,000 metalworking manufacturers 
exiting the local market after the military coup of 1976 (Katz, 1986). Moreover, the 
subsequent hyperinflationary episodes which occurred between 1970 and 1992 –involving 
monthly inflation rates of 200 % in 1989- led to dramatic local currency devaluations which 
further increased long-term exchange rate volatility12 (De Pablo, 2006). 
As Fanelli & Frenkel (1994) argue, macroeconomic uncertainties produced for a majority of 
local firms an opportunistic and defensive microeconomic strategy13 of ‘extreme preference 
for flexibility’, which jeopardized long-term building-up of technological capabilities and 
possibilities of catch up in the 1970s and 1980s. Later, during the policy regimes of the 
1990s, macro variables stabilized but very high exchange rates (as local currency were 
pegged to the USD) led to further speculative diversion of resources from industrial to 
financial and service sectors (Chisari et al., 1996; Schvarzer, 2002). 
Another firm level difficulty can be termed corporate incoherence which resulted from 
extreme opportunistic and rent seeking behavior. Corporate incoherence can be defined as 
a lack of the specialized and focused technological investment which enables the economies 
of learning required for successful growth in the long term (Teece et. al, 1989). Corporate 
incoherence has been observed among many family-owned conglomerates that continually 
diversified across unrelated activities (Liebestein, 1968; Leff, 1978). Regarding rent-
seeking, Schvarzer (1995a) noted that most of the business groups in Argentina prioritized 
the family wealth of the owner (often supported by diversification) rather than the organic 
                                                          
11 For example, Argentina had 34 Presidents between 1930 and 2013, four of which held office in December 2001 
alone, and 74 Ministers of Economy, during the same 83-years period. 
12 At the time of writing, 2014, Argentina was starting to experience a new inflationary episode, with annual inflation 
rates of approximately 30 %, according to unofficial estimations 
(http://www.economist.com/blogs/americasview/2014/09/statistics-argentina). 
13 See also Freeman & Soete (1997) for a general discussion on the innovative strategies of the firm. 
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growth14 of specialized, competitive divisions. Using a sample of the 100 largest firms in 
Argentina in 1993, the author identified 62 widely diversified firms belonging to 43 
holdings or economic groups, of which 26 were family-owned enterprises and the 
remaining 17 were public companies listed on the stock market. Similarly, Kosacoff (1999) 
found that, in 1997, most Argentine MNCs pursued resource- and market-seeking strategies 
of diversification in other Latin American countries. Many of the conglomerates were taken 
over by foreign MNCs during the Washington Consensus’ polices although the same 
diversification strategies remained (Dunning et al., 1997). 
 
2.4 Firm differences and latecomer catch-up (micro-level) 
At the firm level, latecomer disadvantages do not affect all manufacturing firms equally. 
There are likely to be large variations across industries depending on their history and 
external orientation (i.e. inward- or outward-looking) as well as well as the accumulation of 
technological capabilities with respect to R&D, engineering, product design and 
manufacturing. In addition, within any particular industry, according to evolutionary theory 
(Nelson & Winter, 1982) discretionary firm differences exist and these variances matter 
significantly. Nelson (1991, 2008) highlights the fact that a large part of the story of the 
emergence of a viable industry involves the success and growth of a few firms and the 
failure of many others. Dosi et al. (2010) corroborate this proposition empirically for a 
number of leading countries showing that, at any point in time, there is a broad 
heterogeneity across firms in any given industry in terms of growth, productivity and 
profitability.  
From a theoretical viewpoint, Nelson (1991, 2008) argues that the sources of firms’ 
differences (e.g. in the way they respond to policy and external economic circumstances) 
are to be found in their corporate strategy, which is usually underpinned by distinctive 
organizational structures and capabilities. According to evolutionary theory, and in keeping 
with business historians and management scholars, the concept of strategy refers to the 
commitments (explicit or implicit) made by a company to realize its mission, values, 
objectives and the way that the company intends to achieve them. Therefore, we should 
expect a degree of variety in firms’ responses to policy regimes as a result of variety in the 
                                                          
14 See Penrose (1959). 
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way they formulate and arrive at their strategies as well as marked variations in the 
resulting performance of particular firms. 
Extending the evolutionary perspective to the context of developing countries, we should 
also expect latecomer firms to have different corporate strategies with which to cope with 
specific latecomer disadvantages and to exploit any latecomer advantages in their pursuit 
of catching up. Regarding advantages, Mathews (2006) argues that latecomer firms, like 
latecomer countries, are able to exploit their late arrival to tap into advanced technologies 
by importing already developed technologies from abroad, thereby accelerating their 
uptake and learning efforts. A latecomer firm may also benefit from utilizing various forms 
of collaborations with foreign firms and supporting state agencies.  
Hence, the concept of a latecomer’s strategic room for manoeuvre to catch up can be derived 
by combining Nelson’s conceptual insights regarding firm-related differences with 
Gerschenkronian thinking on latecomer catching up. Hopefully, empirical research into 
cases which illuminate latecomers’ strategic manoeuvres can assist us in understanding 
why and how, when facing similarly adverse economic conditions, some firms might pursue 
contrarian paths to catch up. 
 
2.5 Data and research methods 
As noted above, the paper takes an in-depth case study approach to the subject. As 
Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin (2009) show, single case studies are well suited for examining 
unusual phenomena because they allow in-depth investigations of dynamic processes such 
as capability-building  and facilitate the analysis of contrasting results (e.g. individual firm 
success in the context of general failure). Also, in the field of evolutionary economics, 
Nelson (2008) emphasizes the importance of using detailed firm case studies to better 
understand why firms differ and how it matters for industrial dynamics.  
The latecomer firm under study was selected from among the most innovative and best 
performers in Argentina over a 40 year period, for both the capital goods industry and the 
manufacturing sector overall. It is assumed that long run performance reflects a process of 
capability accumulation undertaken over the various policy regimes identified earlier.  
The firm was chosen from a sample of 1,688 manufacturing firms reported in the Second 
Innovation Survey of Argentina (INDEC, 2003), which is the main dataset available on 
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manufacturing firms, covering investment, innovation and performance during the most 
recent economic crisis of Argentina (1998-2001). After reviewing the top performers, we 
also examined other sources of information which confirmed that the firm in question had 
consistently outperformed other industrial firms over a period of around four decades.  
In 2008, the firm chosen (IMPSA) ranked as the 3rd largest Argentine firm operating at 
home and abroad, according to the first authoritative report on Argentine MNCs (ProsperAr 
& Vale-Columbia-Center, 2009). Additionally, in 2013 Tenaris ranked 7th among the largest 
Latin American MNCs (Multilatinas), according to the online business magazine America 
Economia (2013). The purpose of choosing such an extreme case in terms of performance is 
justified because it promises to throw light on the capabilities required to achieve 
international catching up success, despite being situated in an unfavorable context where 
most others firms performed poorly. 
IMPSA, as it is known nowadays, emerged during the 1960s in Argentina and went on to 
become one of Latin America’s largest provider of renewable energy systems, basically 
manufacturing hydro- and wind-turbines and delivering associated high-tech integrated 
solutions. This firm belongs to the Pescarmona family, which is a relatively diversified 
economic group.  
The case study is based on data resulting from privileged access to internal documentation 
(e.g. company’s balance sheets, financial statements, annual reports and internal 
newsletters) and unique archival records consisting of more than 250 newspaper articles 
(selected out of 400,000) that made references to IMPSA as well as the Pescarmona family 
and the affiliates companies over a period of 40 years, between 1968 and 201215. This 
evidence also includes in-depth analysis of interviews conducted over many years by third 
parties (e.g. journalists, consultants and analysts) that included the company’s founder as 
well as subsequent CEOs and directors. Most of quotations had to be translated from 
Spanish to English by the first author.  
Our approach relates the historical experience of policy regimes in Argentina16 –which 
establishes the context of macro decline- with a qualitative characterization of the firm’s 
capability-building process, which is complemented by quantitative measures of its 
                                                          
15 Access was obtained for this unique dataset, which is located in the CDSA-CESPA documentation centre at the 
University of Buenos Aires, Argentina. 
16 See Section 2.3. 
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performance (e.g. sales, exports, profitability and innovation) over the past 40 years. A 
substantial part of the qualitative analysis was carried out with help of computer-assisted 
tools such as keyword search, word frequency, coding, categorization, and content analysis 
through NVivo 10 software (produced by QSR International). The aim was to identify and 
match the different technological capabilities built up by IMPSA to cope with the latecomer 
disadvantages faced by firms in Argentina.  
The usual research quality tests for case studies, as suggested by Kidder & Judd (1986), 
were adopted, including construct validity (i.e. triangulation of multiple sources of 
information to encourage convergent lines of inquiry); internal validity (i.e. pattern-
matching techniques comparing expected outcomes, given the context, with observed 
outcomes of the firm); external validity (i.e. drawing analytical generalizations from 
evolutionary theory to establish the possibility of the firm’s heterogeneity); and reliability 
(i.e. proper documentation of all statements and findings to allow future replications). 
 
2.6 Analytical framework  
Based on the above analysis, figure 1 depicts the dual level perspective we use to address 
the research question of this paper concerning how and why a particular latecomer firm 
that faces adverse economic conditions might still be able to survive, grow and catch up 
with global competitors, while many others fail to do so. 
Figure 1 is used to guide the empirical analysis concerning capabilities formation through 
time and especially those oriented towards innovation and international markets. The 
consequences of corporate strategy including resulting organizational structures, export 
performance and the building up of non-technological capabilities are also analysed.  
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Figure 1: Understanding a latecomer’s capabilities formation to catch up 
 
 
3. CASE STUDY OF IMPSA 
3.1 Introduction 
This section identifies and briefly describes the major stages of IMPSA’s development in 
both local and global markets, as well as any key strategic, organizational, and technological 
milestones since this firm’s inception. This case study will showcase the evolutionary path 
by which a latecomer firm in Argentina was able to catch up with global competitors, 
eventually reaching world-class status as an emerging multinational company. Table 1 
summarizes the main empirical findings: 
 
3.2 IMPSA’s origins and milestones  
Table 1 summarizes chronologically the main empirical findings.  
 
 
Analysis Level Conceptual Framework Methodology
Macro
Micro
Firm-level capabilities
(based on evolutionary theory)
Acquisition Learning Development OUTCOMES
Latecomer disadvantages
(based on catch up theory)
- Market dislocation
- Technological dislocation
- Macroeconomic adversity
- Corporate incoherence
Historical 
Analysis of 
Policy Regimes
In-Depth
Case Study
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Table 1: Key milestones in IMPSA’s evolutionary path to catching up (1907-2013) 
Year Brief Description 
1907 E. Epaminondas Pescarmona migrates from Italy and sets up a metallurgic workshop 
in Mendoza, Argentina, manufacturing winemaking equipment and water irrigation 
gates. 
1915 Pescarmona metallurgic workshop becomes the market leader (with more than 100 
employees) due to the winemaking boom in Mendoza and the resulting extension of 
the water irrigation grid. 
1934 The Great Depression of the early 1930s causes the company to go bankrupt, forcing it 
to shut down. 
1936 Luis M. Pescarmona (the founder’s son) takes over the company and re-opens it with a 
stronger specialization in structural metalworking. 
1945 Thanks to increased government demand for public infrastructure, the firm again 
begins to grow, now employing 150 workers. 
1946 The company’s first industrial plant, which is about one hectare (ha.) in total area, is 
inaugurated in Mendoza. 
1947 The first attempt is made to manufacture turbines for the hydroelectric dam in 
Uspallata, Argentina. 
1965 Pescarmona metallurgic workshop changes its name to IMPSA (Industrias 
Metalurgicas Pescarmona SA) and starts designing and constructing large metal 
structures, turbines, and generators. 
1967 Enrique M. Pescarmona (the founder’s grandson) enters IMPSA’s management and 
leads the way towards the modernization and internationalization of the company. 
1969 IMPSA opens a commercial office in Buenos Aires, the capital city of Argentina. 
1975 IMPSA acquires the first technology transfer licenses to produce hydro turbines from 
Kvaerner-Burg (Norway) and port cranes from Cleveland Crane & Engineering (US). 
1979 The company’s second industrial plant (about 20 ha.) is inaugurated in Mendoza and 
funded by the Inter-American Development Bank (IAD). Plant facilities include the 
largest hydraulic research centre in Latin America. 
1979 IMPSA designs and produces the first three Kaplan turbines for the Arroyito Dam in 
Argentina. IMPSA goes on to supply many other hydroelectric dams in Argentina (e.g. 
Yacyreta, Piedra del Aguila, and Potrerillos) after this project. 
1979 IMPSA signs several technological collaboration agreements with the state of 
Argentina for the production of nuclear equipment for the National Bureau of Atomic 
Energy (CNEA), the state-owned oil company (YPF), and Military Manufacturing (Rio 
III). 
1980 IMPSA manufacture and exports two Francis hydro-turbines to Colombia, becoming 
the first company from a developing country to export that technology. 
1982 IMPSA opens up an international office in Pittsburgh (US) and liaises with US Steel. 
1983 IMPSA pioneers the use and diffusion of both CAD–CAE–CAM (computer-aided design, 
engineering, and manufacturing) and NASTRAN (the high-tech software for structural 
analysis, exclusively licensed by NASA in the US) in Latin America. 
1983 IMPSA exports the first port cranes to the Dominican Republic. 
1985  IMPSA opens international offices in Hong Kong to supply the Asian markets. 
1986 IMPSA manufactures and exports a turnkey hydro plant (including technology 
transfer) to China. 
1987 IMPSA manufactures and exports two hydro turbines to the US market (Oklahoma and 
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Oregon) after winning a public bid against leading global competitors. 
1992 IMPSA takes advantage of privatization opportunities in Argentina and diversifies into 
non-tradable activities such as transport, telecommunications, and insurance; 
unfortunately, they have very little success in any of these areas. 
1994 IMPSA develops its own proprietary software for the analysis of turbines and 
generators, and later is awarded the ISO 9001 for its quality management systems. 
1995 IMPSA opens a commercial office and third production facilities  in Malaysia. 
1995 IMPSA delivers integrated solutions for the first time (i.e. built–rehabilitate–operate–
maintain) for the CBK hydroelectric project in the Philippines. 
1995 UNIDO lists IMPSA among the top 100 most innovative firms in Latin America. 
1997 IMPSA exports port cranes to the US Navy and the State of Florida, as well as to 
Shanghai (China); IMPSA becomes the second largest exporter of port cranes in the 
world. 
2003 IMPSA developed wind turbines and generators for the first time, using their own 
technology (UNIPOWER). 
2005 IMPSA manufactures and installs the world’s largest port cranes, in Malaysia. 
2007 IMPSA opens up its fourth production facility (in Brazil) to produce wind turbines and 
generators; five years later, it opens its fifth production facility (in Brazil), to develop 
hydroelectric technologies. 
2010 IMPSA beats out GE, Siemens, and Alstom to supply the world’s most efficient and 
third-largest hydropower plants in Bakun (Malaysia) and Belo Monte (Brazil), 
respectively. 
2010 IMPSA is ranked the #1 high-growth family enterprise (by Ernst & Young), the #7 
largest MNC from Latin America (by America Economia), and the #3 largest MNC from 
Argentina (by Vale-Columbia Centre). 
2013 IMPSA becomes a global leader in both hydropower and wind-power technologies, 
with more than 6,000 employees worldwide and total sales of over one billion USD 
across 30 countries. 
Source: The authors’ own elaboration, based on IMPSA’s annual reports as well as on archival records. 
 
IMPSA’s evolutionary path (illustrated in Table 1) can be separated into five clear stages: 
Building corporate coherence (1900s–1960s) 
IMPSA’s roots can be traced back to 1907, when E. Epaminondas Pescarmona emigrated 
from Torino, Italy, and settled in the winemaking region of Mendoza, Argentina, to take 
advantage of the economic boom in Argentina at the time. There, he put in practice his 
qualifications as a mechanical technician and set up a small metallurgic workshop, 
manufacturing cast-iron spare parts, winemaking equipment, and gates for irrigation 
channels. Thanks to the increasing demand for wine from Mendoza, in less than ten years 
the firm became the market leader in the provision of winemaking equipment (e.g. grape 
crushers, grape presses, and wine barrel sinks) and water irrigation gates for ditches, 
employing around 120 workers. However, a couple of years later, the company was badly 
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hit by the Great Depression of the early 1930s. Surprisingly, instead of bailing out such a 
successful firm, the state-owned bank Banco Nacion forced Pescarmona’s company to file 
for bankruptcy in 1934. Two years later, Luis M. Pescarmona  (the founder’s son) took over 
and re-opened the company, but now with a greater specialization in structural 
metalworking. Increased government spending on public infrastructure during the ISI 
regime helped the firm to resume its path to growth, and by the mid-1940s, their first 
industrial plant (with a total area of around one hectare) had been inaugurated in Mendoza 
and was employing more than 150 workers. In 1942 the firm set up its hydromechanics 
department, drawing on its technological background in winemaking equipment and water 
irrigation gates. Five years later, the firm participated, for the first time, in the manufacture 
of turbines for a hydroelectric dam in Uspallata, Argentina. Finally, in 1965 Pescarmona 
metallurgic workshop changed its name to IMPSA (Industrias Metalurgicas Pescarmona 
SA), its present name. IMPSA’s corporate coherence was centred on core technologies in the 
capital goods industry; namely, the design and construction of large metal structures, as 
well as turbines and generators for hydropower plants. 
 
Technological modernization and capacity expansion (1970s–1980s) 
Enrique M. Pescarmona  (the founder’s grandson and the current CEO) joined IMPSA’s 
management team in 1967 and led the way towards the company’s technological 
modernization and capacity expansion. In 1969, only two years after this change in 
leadership, IMPSA expanded beyond the relatively isolated province of Mendoza and 
opened its first commercial office in Buenos Aires, the main economic hub of Argentina. 
Over the next decade (1975–1985), IMPSA signed nearly 20 technology transfer 
agreements with several mature firms, ranging from hydro turbine technology from 
Kvaemer-Burg (Norway) to port crane technology from Cleveland Crane & Engineering 
(US). In 1979, IMPSA’s second industrial plant (this one, about 20 hectares in total area) 
was inaugurated thanks to investment funds provided by the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IADB). These new facilities tripled IMPSA’s production capacity, and included the 
largest hydraulic research centre in Latin America, with a state-of-the-art test bench. As a 
result, in the same year, IMPSA was able to design and produce their first three Kaplan 
turbines for the Arroyito Dam in Argentina. Over the next couple of years IMPSA became 
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the leading turbine and generator provider for Argentina’s main state-funded hydroelectric 
projects (e.g. Yacyreta, Piedra del Aguila, and Potrerillos). During this same period, IMPSA 
signed a number of technological collaboration agreements for the production of nuclear 
equipment for several public bodies, such as the National Bureau of Atomic Energy (CNEA), 
the state-owned oil company (YPF), and Military Manufacturing (Fabricaciones Militares 
Rio III). In this way, the company was able to expand and complement its technological 
base, moving towards the provision of a comprehensive set of capital goods for the power 
generation industry. 
 
Internationalization and access to global markets (1980s–1990s) 
The prior acquisition and development of advanced technologies, along with the expansion 
of production capacities, enabled IMPSA to gain access to global markets, starting with 
neighbouring countries in Latin America. In 1980, IMPSA manufactured and exported two 
Francis hydro-turbines to Colombia, becoming the first company from a developing country 
to export such a technology. A few years later, IMPSA also manufactured and exported their 
first port cranes to the Dominican Republic. Although IMPSA already had commercial 
offices in Brazil and Colombia, in 1982 the company decided to move towards more 
advanced export markets, opening up an international office in Pittsburgh (US). This 
internationalization brought new technological opportunities; for instance, IMPSA received 
exclusive rights to use and distribute NASTRAM—the world’s most advanced software for 
structural analysis, developed by NASA (US)—in Latin America. This globalization strategy 
continued in 1985 with the opening of international offices in Hong Kong and Beijing, with a 
goal of supplying the growing Asian markets. In 1986, IMPSA manufactured and exported a 
turnkey hydropower plant to China, with an agreement that included the technology 
transfer. In the following year, IMPSA sold, for the first time, two hydro turbines to the US 
market, in Oklahoma and Oregon, beating out global leaders such as Voith-Siemens 
(Germany), Neyrpic-Alstom (France), Voest-Alpine (Austria), and Nissho Iwai (Japan). 
 
Diversification attempts and little success (1990s) 
During the 1990s, IMPSA continued its internationalization process, gaining access to 
distant markets. For example, in 1995, the company opened up another international office, 
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as well as its third production facility (this one in Malaysia) for the production and 
commercialization of both hydro turbines and port cranes. As a result of this capacity 
expansion, IMPSA delivered, for the first time, integrated solutions (i.e. build–rehabilitate–
operate–maintain) for the CBK hydroelectric project in the Philippines. Two years later 
IMPSA exported automatic port cranes to the US Navy and the State of Florida, as well as to 
Shanghai (China), and soon became the world’s second-largest exporter of port cranes. At 
the same time, IMPSA worked to take as much advantage as possible of privatisation and 
market deregulation opportunities that opened up in Argentina, as well as throughout Latin 
America, under the policy reforms promoted by the Washington Consensus. For instance, 
IMPSA moved into transport (i.e. railways and airlines), satellite telecommunications, and 
insurance activities; at one point, these three sectors accounted for nearly half of the 
company’s turnover. However, these ventures were short-lived, and IMPSA exit all three 
sectors after only a couple of years, in some cases (e.g. IMPSAT telecommunications) with 
substantial economic losses. 
 
Specialization and leadership in renewable energies (2000s–Present Day) 
After Argentina’s devastating economic crisis in 2001–2002, IMPSA went back to their roots 
and restructured their business and organization towards a specialization in renewable 
energies. Their results were very impressive: Figure 1, below, shows IMPSA’s five-fold 
growth in total sales, from 200 million pesos in 2004 to nearly 1 billion USD in 2011.  
The reasons behind this tremendous growth began in 2003, when IMPSA became the first 
company from Latin America to develop a wind turbine and generator with its own 
proprietary technology (UNIPOWER(R)). Brazil’s growing economy, compared alongside 
Argentina’s decline, convinced IMPSA to shift their main operations and assets towards 
their neighbouring country: In 2007 the company inaugurated its fourth-ever production 
facility, located in Pernambuco, Brazil, which produced wind turbines and generators. Five 
years later, IMPSA opened its fifth-ever production facility, in the same region, to further 
develop the hydroelectric technologies being used in the industrial plants of Argentina and 
Malaysia. IMPSA’s substantial investment in innovation and production capacity enabled 
them to supply the world’s most efficient and the world’s third-largest hydropower plants, 
in Bakun (Malaysia) and in Belo Monte (Brazil), respectively; this accomplishment brought 
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them into competition with global leaders such as General Electric (US), Siemens 
(Germany), and Alstom (France). 
 
Figure 1. Growth of total sales for IMPSA (1989–2012) 
 
Note: The values were deflated by the Wholesale Price Index (IPIM, Indice de Precios Internos al por Mayor). The 
base year for the calculations was 1993=100, which implies that the values expressed in pesos (i.e. Argentina’s 
local currency) were equivalent to USD. 
Source: The author’s own elaboration, based on IMPSA's Annual Reports and Financial Statements 
 
For their outstanding performance, in 2010 IMPSA was ranked the #1 high-growth family 
enterprise (by Ernst & Young), the #3 largest MNC from Argentina (by Vale-Columbia 
Centre), and the #7 largest MNC from Latin America (by America Economia). Today, this 
one-time latecomer firm has caught up with global competitors and has become a world-
class leader in both hydropower and wind-power technologies, with more than 6,000 
employees worldwide and total sales of over one billion USD across 30 countries. 
 
3.3 Discussion 
This section explains why and how IMPSA overcame the latecomer disadvantages 
prevailing in Argentina—distant global markets, technological backwardness, an adverse 
macroeconomy, and entrepreneurial and corporate incoherence—through their corporate 
strategy, organizational structure and core capabilities (mostly in the technological 
domain).  
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The empirical analysis of IMPSA’s evolutionary path (partially reflected in Figure 1) shows 
that this latecomer firm has indeed caught up with global competitors and had reached 
world-class status in the renewable energies industry, despite the adverse policy regimes 
that have prevailed in Argentina.  
IMPSA followed a contrarian path that allowed the company to catch up while many other 
latecomer firms in Argentina lagged and fell further behind. For example, IMPSA doggedly 
continued in the capital goods industry, focusing on a few core technologies, while many 
other firms succumbed to the temptations of short-term incentives and changed their 
businesses to spread across wide-ranging industries. IMPSA invested heavily in the 
technological modernization of their production facilities, while many other firms 
speculated in the financial and commodities markets. IMPSA expanded internationally to 
distant global markets while many other firms in Argentina were taken over by foreign 
corporations. IMPSA exported high-tech port cranes from a landlocked city (Mendoza) 
while many other firms exported, at best, natural resources, capitalizing on Argentina’s 
comparative advantage. In line with the conceptual framework suggested in this work—
coupling Gerschenkron and Nelson’s ideas—IMPSA overcame the prevailing latecomer 
disadvantages by manoeuvring differently than other firms in terms of corporate strategy, 
organizational structure, and core capabilities.  
IMPSA has consistently pursued a corporate strategy that has allowed them to overcome 
technological backwardness, distant global markets, an adverse macroeconomy, and 
corporate in-coherence. Regarding technological backwardness, IMPSA placed 
technological innovation at the forefront of their corporate strategy, not only as a family 
passion but also as a critical component to survival in the increasingly competitive markets 
of capital goods. Technology transfer agreements, training personnel abroad, and in-house 
R&D and reverse engineering were among the learning mechanisms that IMPSA used to 
overcome the technological backwardness prevailing in Argentina. Technology acquisition 
and development at IMPSA has been deeply entwined with a clearly defined strategy of 
gaining access to distant global markets. This latecomer firm understood from early on that 
it had to compete internationally to get to know the state-of-the-art technologies that were 
globally available; such technology would then, in turn, be crucial in allowing the firm to 
continue expanding and competing internationally. IMPSA was fully aware that such a co-
evolutionary process would eventually form a virtuous circle between technology and 
exports. These results shed some light on those empirical studies that found contradictory 
evidence regarding the causal direction between technology and exports at the firm level. 
The causality here is likely to be circular, although a prior technological base might be 
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needed to gain access to competitive export markets. To address Argentina’s adverse 
macroeconomy, an equally important facet of IMPSA’s corporate strategy has been to 
pursue emerging markets that have large and stable demand, as well plenty of available 
credit, such as Southeast Asia and Brazil. The lack of State support to finance innovation 
and the export of capital goods from Argentina has been the most adverse macroeconomic 
condition faced by this latecomer firm, and neither high rates of inflation nor volatile 
exchange rates have been as detrimental to corporate development as inadequate interest 
rates and the consequent lack of credit proved to be. IMPSA worked around this 
disadvantage by following a corporate strategy of indirect financing that changed in 
response to the different policy regimes: this played out as compensation in the form of 
reciprocal credits with the State for public infrastructure works in the 1980s, quick entry 
into and exit from the privatization business in the 1990s to increase corporate cash flow, 
and financial leverage via subsidized credit from Brazilian state-funded banks in the 2000s. 
Lastly, to address the challenge of corporate in-coherence, the final and overarching aspect 
of IMPSA’s strategy has been its long-term corporate coherence, which it has maintained 
despite the many changes in policy regimes. Unlike most family-owned economic groups, 
which diversified their businesses in Argentina in response to short-term incentives, IMPSA 
has consistently and coherently specialized in a few core technologies within the capital 
goods industry: hydro- and wind-power generation, and port cranes. After recording major 
losses during its diversification attempts in the 1990s, IMPSA realised that learning is 
technology- and sector-specific, and resumed its traditional family business in renewable 
energies. 
The implementation of such a corporate strategy required IMPSA to set up organizational 
structures that were strong enough to allow for the development of specialized routines 
over a long period of time, as well as flexible enough to cope with the short-term changes in 
policy regimes that occurred so frequently in Argentina. IMPSA adjusted its organizational 
structure to overcome technological backwardness, distant global markets, an adverse 
macro-economy, and corporate incoherence in the following ways: IMPSA implemented its 
technological strategy by gradually upgrading from extra-organizational links with leading 
firms (via technology transfer and personnel training) to intra-organizational links through 
the early creation of its own R&D laboratory in Argentina, which specialized in 
hydromechanics. As their corporate strategy focused mainly on renewable energies, IMPSA 
set up another R&D laboratory in Brazil to specialize in wind turbines and generators. In 
addition to these R&D labs, IMPSA allocated substantial resources to their finance 
department to deal with the chronic lack of credit in Argentina, which particularly 
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hampered the financing of project-based organizations in the capital goods industry. Access 
to distant global markets would have not been possible without the creation of commercial 
offices abroad, which were later supported by production facilities. This involved a major 
Chandlerian transformation from the traditional vertically managed family enterprises 
based in Argentina, to the more bureaucratic and horizontally-managed multinational 
corporations based in Brazil. Unlike many other family conglomerates in Argentina, IMPSA 
succeeded thank to their highly professionalized managerial succession, whereby family 
members were given positions according to their specific qualifications and expertise (e.g. 
engineering, finance, or corporate law). 
Lastly, the pursuit of IMPSA’s corporate strategy, as well as the functioning of its 
organizational structure, have been undoubtedly underpinned by a set of core capabilities, 
which allowed the company to articulate their resources in a meaningful way. In turn, the 
nature and scope of the latter were bounded to the firm’s strategy and structure, 
respectively. IMPSA’s evolutionary path to catching up included a great deal of 
experimentation, given Argentina’s adverse environment of changing policy regimes. 
Nevertheless, IMPSA acquired, accumulated, developed, and continually improved a 
number of world-class capabilities that distinguished it from other Argentinean firms and 
global competitors alike in the capital goods industry. IMPSA’s formation of technological 
capabilities followed a truly evolutionary process of trial and error, learning from their 
mistakes along a well-defined and coherent technological trajectory. Significant variations 
from these core capabilities—such as their short-lived and ill-fated involvements in airlines, 
railways, and telecommunications—have proved to be quite unsuccessful for the company. 
IMPSA has systematically built up its technological capabilities from its initial focus of 
winemaking equipment and water irrigation gates to products such as hydro turbines, 
metallic structures, high-altitude port cranes, wind turbines, and generators.  IMPSA 
learned from and built on some of the adverse macroeconomic conditions prevailing in 
Argentina, using these situations to develop specific non-technological capabilities. The 
chronic lack of credit, as well as the economic and political instability in Argentina, forced 
IMPSA to develop debt issuance and restructuring as well as risk-management capabilities, 
respectively. The combination of these core (hydro and wind) and soft (finance and risk-
management) technologies, along with project-related competences, supported IMPSA in 
developing integrated-solutions capabilities for power generation from renewable energies. 
Eventually, their manufacture, delivery, and provision of integrated solutions achieved 
world-class status through the development of export capabilities. These export capabilities 
were the result of the gradual and sequential accumulation of production, technological, 
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project finance, and commercialization capabilities. Finally, IMPSA’s formation of 
organizational capabilities can be understood as a hierarchy of organizational routines that 
reflect two other distinctive capabilities. At the top executive level, all IMPSA CEOs have 
consistently shown strong entrepreneurial capabilities, recovering from many near-
bankruptcy situations without wavering from their focus on the capital goods industry. 
Building upon their engineering background, they learned how to capitalize on the many 
problem-solving challenges that emerged from Argentina. At the lower levels of this 
project-based organization, managers and workers have shown outstanding management 
capabilities, learning from and carrying out consistent task routines across multiple 
projects and over four generations. 
 
4. Conclusions and Implications 
The empirical analysis of IMPSA shows that this latecomer firm caught up with global 
competitors and reached world-class status in the renewable energy industry by building 
up a distinctive set of technological capabilities, despite the adverse policy regimes that 
have prevailed in Argentina over the past 40 years.  
IMPSA followed a contrarian path that allowed the company to catch up while many other 
latecomer firms in Argentina lagged and fell further behind. For example, IMPSA doggedly 
continued delivering hydro- and wind-power systems, focusing on a few turbine 
technologies, while many other firms succumbed to the temptations of the policy-induced 
short-term incentives and changed their businesses to spread across wide-ranging 
industries. IMPSA invested heavily in the technological modernization of its production 
facilities, while many other firms speculated in financial and commodities markets. IMPSA 
expanded internationally capturing advanced global markets while many other firms in 
Argentina were taken over by foreign corporations or exited the manufacturing sector. For 
example, IMPSA exported high-tech port cranes from a landlocked city (Mendoza) while 
many other firms exported, at best, natural resources, following the Washington Consensus’ 
polices. In line with the conceptual framework suggested in this work—coupling 
Gerschenkron and Nelson’s ideas—IMPSA overcame its prevailing latecomer disadvantages 
by manoeuvring differently than other firms and by building up a coherent set of 
technological capabilities over time.  
IMPSA’s catching up path included a great deal of experimentation, given Argentina’s 
adverse environment of changing policy regimes. IMPSA acquired, accumulated, developed, 
and continually improved a number of world-class capabilities that distinguished it from 
25 
 
other Argentinean firms and global competitors alike in the renewable energy systems. As 
of 2012, and in less than 10 years, IMPSA’s provision of integrated solutions has turned the 
company into Latin America’s leading provider of renewable energies, with regional market 
shares of around 30 % and 15 % in hydro- and wind-power, respectively, competing hand-
to-hand with global leaders like Siemens, Vestas, General Electric and Chinese companies. 
Nevertheless, this success story followed a truly evolutionary process of trial and error, 
learning from many mistakes along a well-defined and coherent technological trajectory in 
the provision of renewable energy systems. For instance, the firm engaged in significant ill-
fated deviations away from these core capabilities—such as its short-lived involvements in 
airlines, railways, and telecommunications—all these excursions proved to be unsuccessful 
for the company, encouraging it to return to a core, organic path of expansion.  IMPSA built 
up its distinctive set of technological capabilities from its initial focus of winemaking 
equipment and water irrigation gates to products such as hydroelectric turbines, metallic 
structures, high-altitude port cranes, wind turbines, and generators. These progressions 
involved step by step extensions of existing capabilities, as shown in Part 3. Technology was 
acquired via transfer agreements, training personnel abroad, in-house R&D and reverse 
engineering of leading edge foreign products.  In pursuing a path of growth and smart 
specialization, rather than contraction and diversification, IMPSA engaged with, and in 
some cases exploited, the adverse conditions prevailing in Argentina, helping it to build up 
essential non-technological capabilities. The chronic lack of credit, as well as the economic 
and political instability in Argentina, forced IMPSA to develop debt restructuring and risk-
management capabilities, respectively. The combination of these core (hydro and wind) and 
soft (finance and risk-management) technologies, along with project-related competences, 
supported IMPSA in developing integrated-solutions capabilities for power generation from 
renewable energies. By exporting to advanced markets, the firm was forced to continually 
improve the technological capabilities required to manufacture, deliver, and develop 
integrated solutions. World-class status was eventually achieved through the gradual and 
sequential accumulation of production, technological, project finance, and marketing 
capabilities.  
Technological and other associated capabilities can be understood as emerging from ‘higher 
order’ leadership and entrepreneurial capabilities. For example, at the top executive level, 
four generations of CEOs have consistently exhibited strong entrepreneurial capabilities, 
enabling the firm to recover from near-bankruptcy situations without wavering from its 
focus on capital goods manufacture. IMPSA’s corporate coherence has been highly unusual 
for family-owned enterprises long established in Argentina. As a result of inspirational 
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leadership, other levels of management learned how to carry out routines across multiple 
projects enabling rapid and effective technological learning over several generations of 
product. 
The paper contributed a conceptual framework to explore the contrarian technological path 
of IMPSA within the unfavourable environment of Argentina, combining elements of 
latecomer firm theory and the evolutionary interpretations of firms’ heterogeneity in line 
with Nelson (1991 & 2008) and Dosi et al (2010).  The framework explained how it is 
possible for highly successful firms to co-exist with the majority of poor performers within 
the same domestic economic environment and over long periods of time. In line with 
evolutionary theorizing, the framework helped us to understand how a single firm was able 
to acquire, nurture, accumulate and develop a set of distinctive capabilities within a 
relatively well-defined technological trajectory in a complex capital goods sector, despite 
persistent short-term economic and policy disincentives. 
Although there can be no simple generalisations or models with regard to capability 
building under adversity, the case does confirm that firms can respond differently to the 
same policy regimes and external incentives. This suggests that it is incumbent upon 
individual firms to pave their own way towards catching up, rather than responding to 
government programmes or following ‘best practices’ of other. In terms of implications for 
strategy, latecomer firms facing adverse policy regimes should (i) reject any incentives or 
encouragements, which result in inward-looking and short-term behaviours and (ii) build 
up distinctive sets of both technological and non-technological capabilities which promise 
continued innovation as well as engagement with more sophisticated and rapidly growing 
foreign markets. 
Regarding policy implications, in episodes of crisis and decline policy makers should 
consider learning lessons from firms which are succeeding despite difficult conditions and 
discover the capability-building process underlying their success. Such firm level evidence 
may be useful for amending and adapting policies to encourage more firms to innovate and 
export. It is also important for policy makers to recognise that some firms may not respond 
to particular policy regimes in the ways expected and that this may not always be a ‘bad 
thing’. 
Further research may wish to explore the progress of other latecomer firms both in 
Argentina and in other countries facing extremely adverse external circumstances in order 
to assess the extent to which individual companies have built up distinctive technological 
capabilities.  Researchers may also wish to assess and compare progress of successful 
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latecomers in other sectors to look for similarities and differences in contrarian catch up 
paths. The lessons from even a small number of highly successful firms like IMPSA could 
prove valuable and insightful, allowing us to understand the scope of latecomer firms’ 
capability building prospects under adverse conditions.  Ultimately, such evidence may 
prove useful for policy makers attempting to promote successful catching up under adverse 
or crisis conditions. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
  Abramovitz, M. (1986), ‘Catching up, forging ahead, and falling behind’, The Journal of Economic 
History, Vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 385-406 
 Amann, E. and Cantwell, J. (2012), ‘Innovative firms in emerging markets countries: an 
introduction’, in Amann, E. and Cantwell, J. (eds.), Innovative Firms in Emerging Market Countries, 
Oxford University Press.  
 Amsden, A. (1989), Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization, Oxford University 
Press, NY. 
 Amsden, A. (2001), ‘The Rise of the Rest - Challenges to the West From Late-Industrializing 
Economies’, Oxford University Press, NY. 
 Baumol, W. (1986), ‘Productivity growth, convergence, and welfare: what the long-run data 
show’, American Economic Review, Vol. 76, No.5, pp.1073-85. 
 Bell, M. and Pavitt, K. (1993), ‘Technological accumulation and industrial growth:  contrasts 
between developed and developing countries’, Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 
157-210. 
 Braun, O. and Joy, L.  (1981), ‘Un modelo de estancamiento económico - Estudio de caso sobre la 
economía argentina,  Desarrollo Económico, Vol. 20, No. 80, pp. 585-604 
 Chandler, A.D. Jr. (1966), Strategy and Structure, NY: Doubleday & Co., Anchor Books Edition. 
 Chandler, A.D. Jr. (1977), The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business, 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 Chandler, A.D. Jr. (1990), Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism, Cambridge, MA: 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 
 Chisari, O., Fanelli, J.M., and Frenkel, R. (1996), ‘Argentina: Growth resumption, sustainability, 
and environment’, World Development, Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 227-240. 
 Chudnovsky, D., Kosacoff, B., and Lopez, A. (1999), Las Multinacionales Latinoamericanas: Sus 
Estrategias en un Mundo Globalizado, Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica. 
 Cimoli, M. and Katz, J. (2002), ‘Structural reforms, technological gaps and economic development. 
A Latin American perspective’, Serie Desarrollo Productivo, No. 129, ECLAC / UN, Santiago.  
28 
 
 Cimoli, M., Dosi, G., and Stiglitz, J. (eds.) (2009), Industrial Policy and Development. The Political 
Economy of Capabilities Accumulation,  Initiative for Policy Dialogue Series C, New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
 Dahlman, C.J., Ross-Larson, B., and Westphal, L.E. (1987), ‘Managing technological development: 
lessons from the newly industrialising countries’, World Development, Vol. 15, Issue 6, pp. 759-
775. 
 Davies, A. (2004), ‘Moving base into high-value integrated solutions: a value stream approach’. 
Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol. 13, No. 5, pp. 727-756. 
 De Long, B. (1987), ‘Have productivity levels converged? Productivity growth, convergence, and 
welfare in the very long run’, NBER Working Papers, No. W2419, Cambridge, MA. 
 De Pablo, J.C. (2006), ‘Así  somos.  ¿cambiaremos  alguna  vez?’, Escritos seleccionados 2000, 
Reproducido de Libro de oro, Grupo Editor EDIGAR, Bs. As. 
 Della Paolera, G. and Gallo, E. (2003), ‘Epilogue: the Argentine puzzle’, in Della Paolera, G. and 
Taylor, A. (eds.), A New Economic History of Argentina, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
 Dosi, G., Lechevalier, S. and Secchi, A. (2010), ‘Introduction: Inter-firm heterogeneity, nature, 
sources and consequences for industrial dynamics’, Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol. 19, 
Issue 6, pp. 1867-1890. 
 Dosi, G., Nelson, R., and Winter, S. (2000), ‘Introduction: The Nature and Dynamics of 
Organizational Capabilities’, in Dosi, G., Nelson, R., and Winter, S. (eds.),  The Nature and 
Dynamics of Organizational Capabilities, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 Dunning, J.H., Van Hoesel, R., and Narula, R. (1998), “Third world multinationals revisited: new 
developments and theoretical implications,” in Dunning, J.H. (ed.), Globalization, Trade and 
Foreign Direct Investment, Oxford: Pergammon Press, pp. 255-286. 
 Dutrenit, G. (2004), ‘Building technological capabilities in latecomer firms: a review essay’, 
Science Technology & Society, Vol. 9, pp. 209-241. 
 ECLAC / UN (1996),  América Latina y el Caribe quince años después: de la década perdida a la 
transformación económica, 1980-1995, Santiago: Fondo de Cultura Económica. 
 Eisenhardt, K.M. (1989), ‘Building theories from case study research’, The Academy of 
Management Review; Vol. 14, No. 4, pp. 532. 
 Fajnzylber, F. (1984), La Industrialización Trunca de América Latina, Buenos Aires: Centro Editor 
de América Latina. 
 Fanelli, J. M. and Frenkel, R. (1994), ‘Estabilidad y estructura: interacciones en el crecimiento 
económico’, Serie Economía, Documento No. 104, CEDES, Buenos Aires. 
 Fanelli, J.M., and Frenkel, R. (1995), ‘Micro-macro interaction in economic development’, UNCTAD 
Review, Buenos Aires. 
 Figueiredo, P. (2002), ‘Does technological learning pay off? Inter-firm differences in technological 
capability-accumulation paths and operational performance improvement’, Research Policy, Vol. 
31, Issue 1, pp. 73-94. 
29 
 
 Freeman, C. and Soete, L. (1997), The Economics of Industrial Innovation, Cambridge MA: The MIT 
Press. 
 Galbraith, J. R. (2002), ‘Organising to deliver solutions’, Organizational Dynamics, Vol. 31, No. 2, 
pp. 194-207. 
 Gao, X. (2014), ‘A latecomer's strategy to promote a technology standard: The case of Datang and 
TD-SCDMA’, Research Policy, Vol. 43, Issue 3, pp. 597-607. 
 Gerschenkron, A. (1962), Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
 Hamel, G. (1998), ‘Strategy innovation and the quest for value’, Sloan Management Review, Vol. 
39, No. 2, pp. 7-14.  
 Hirschman, A. (1958), The Strategy of Economic Development, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University 
Press. 
 Hobday, M. (1995), ‘East Asian latecomer firms: learning the technology of electronics’, World 
Development, Vol. 23, No. 7, pp. 1171-l193. 
 INDEC (2003), ‘Segunda encuesta nacional de innovación y conducta tecnológica de las empresas 
argentinas (1998-2001)’, 38 Estudios, INDEC, Buenos Aires. 
 Katz, J. (1986), ‘Desarrollo y crisis de la capacidad tecnológica latinoamericana: el caso de la 
industria metalmecánica’, Serie Estudios sobre Desarrollo Tecnológico, ECLAC / UN, Santiago. 
 Katz, J. (1999), ‘Reformas estructurales y comportamiento tecnológico: reflexiones en torno a las 
fuentes y naturaleza del cambio tecnológico en América Latina en los años noventa’, Serie 
Reformas Económicas, No. 13, ECLAC / UN, Santiago. 
 Katz, J. (2000), ‘Structural changes and productivity in Latin American industry, 1970-1996’, 
CEPAL Review, No. 71, ECLAC / UN, Santiago. 
 Katz, J. (2001), ‘Structural reforms and technological behaviour: The sources and nature of 
technological change in Latin America in the 1990s’, Research Policy, Vol. 30, Issue 1, pp. 1-19. 
 Katz, J. and Bernat, G. (2011), ‘Creación de empresas, crecimiento en la productividad y cambio 
estructural como respuesta a una modificación en la política macroeconómica. Evidencia para 
Argentina’, Revista de Economia Politica de Buenos Aires, Year 5, Vol. 9-10, pp. 9-39. 
 Katz, J. and Bernat, G. (2013), ‘Interacciones entre la macro y la micro en la post-convertibilidad: 
dinámica industrial y restricción externa’, Desarrollo Económico, Vol. 52, No. 207-208, pp.383-
404. 
 Kiamehr, M., Hobday, M, and Kermanshah, A. (2013), ‘Latecomer systems integration capability 
in complex capital goods: the case of Iran’s electricity generation systems’, Industrial and 
Corporate Change, first published online November 19, 2013, pp. 1–28. 
 Kidder, L. H., & Judd, C. M. (1986), Research methods in social relations, New York: Holt, Rinehart 
and Winston. 
 Kim, L. (1997), Imitation to Innovation: The Dynamics of Korea’s Technological Learning, Boston : 
Harvard Business School Press,  
30 
 
 Kosacoff, B. (1999), ‘El caso Argentino’, in Chudnovsky, D., Kosacoff, B., and Lopez, A. (eds.), Las 
Multinacionales Latinoamericanas: Sus Estrategias en un Mundo Globalizado, pp. 66-164, Buenos 
Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica. 
 Lee, K. and Lim, C. (2001), ‘Technological regimes, catching-up and leapfrogging: findings from 
the Korean industries’, Research Policy, Vol. 30, Issue 3, pp. 459-483. 
 Leff, N. H. (1978), ‘Industrial organization and entrepreneurship in developing countries: The 
economic groups’, Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 26, No. 4, pp.661-675. 
 Leibenstein, H. (1968), ‘Entrepreneurship and development’, The American Economic Review, Vol. 
58, No. 2, pp. 72-83. 
 Lewis, W.A. (1978), The Evolution of the International Order, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 Maddison, A. (1995), Monitoring the World Economy, 1820-1992, Washington, DC: Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
 Malerba, F. and Nelson, R. (2011), ‘Learning and catching up in different sectoral systems: 
evidence from six industries’, Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol. 20, No. 6, pp. 1645-1675. 
 Mathews, J. A. (2006), ‘Catch-up strategies and the latecomer effect in industrial development’, 
New Political Economy, Vol. 11, No. 3. 
 Mathews, J. A. and Cho, D-S (2000), Tiger Technology: The creation of a Semiconductor Industry in 
East Asia, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
 Nelson, R.  (1991), ‘Why do firms differ, and how does it matter?’, Strategic Management Journal, 
Vol. 12, Issue S2, pp. 61-74. 
 Nelson, R. and Winter, S. (1982), An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
 Nelson, R. (2008), ‘Why do firms differ, and how does it matter? A revisitation’, Seoul Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 21, No.4. 
 Penrose, E.T. (1959), The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, New York: John Wiley. 
 Prahalad, C. K. and Hamel, G. (1990), ‘The core competence of the corporation ‘, Harvard Business 
Review, Vol. 68, Issue 3, pp. 79-91. 
 Prebisch, R. (1950), ‘The economic development of Latin America and its principal problems’, 
Economic Bulletin for Latin America, Vol. 7, No. 1, February 1962 (reprinted), pp.1-22.  
 ProsperAr & Vale Columbia Center Report (2009), ‘First ranking of Argentine multinationals 
finds diversified successes in internationalization’. Online Available: 
http://www.vcc.columbia.edu/files/vale/documents/EMGP-Argentina-Report-2009-Final.pdf  
 Rosenberg, N. (1976), Perspectives on Technology, London: Cambridge University Press. 
 Rostow, W.W. (1960), The Stages of Economic Growth. A Non-Communist Manifesto, London: 
Cambridge University Press. 
31 
 
 Samuelson. P. A. (1980), ‘The world economy at century's end’, IEA’s 6th World Congress, 
México. Cited in The Collected Scientific Papers of Paul Samuelson, Vol. 5, Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press. 
 Schumpeter, J.A. (1934), The Theory Of Economic Development: An Inquiry Into Profits, Capital, 
Credit, Interest, And The Business Cycle, New York: OUP. 
 Schvarzer, J. (1995a), ‘Grandes grupos económicos en la Argentina. Formas de propiedad y 
lógicas de expansión’, in Bustos, P. (ed.), Mas allá de la Estabilidad, Buenos Aires: Fundación F. 
Ebert. 
 Schvarzer, J. (1995b), ‘Paradoxes of Argentine (under) development’, in Social Development and 
the differentiation of growth pattern, HOST Network, UNESCO-MOST Programme, Vol. No 1, 
Vietnam. 
 Schvarzer, J. (1997), ‘Los grandes grupos económicos argentinos: un largo proceso de retirada 
estratégica poco convencional’, Nueva Sociedad, Vol. 151, pp. 88-101. 
 Schvarzer, J. (2000), La Industria que Supimos Conseguir. Una Historia Político-Social de la 
Industria Argentina, Buenos Aires: Ediciones Cooperativas. 
 Schvarzer, J., Rojas-Breu, M., and Papa, J. (2003), ‘La industria automotriz argentina en 
perspectiva. La reconversión de la década del noventa como prólogo a la crisis actual’, CESPA 
Documento de Trabajo CESPA, No. 5, Faculty of Economics, University of Buenos Aires, Bs. As. 
 Schvarzer, Jorge (2002), “El fracaso histórico de la convertibilidad. La Argentina en la década de 
los noventa”,  Realidad Económica, No 187, Abril-Mayo, Buenos Aires. 
 Teece, D., Rumelt, R., Dosi, G., and Winter, S. (1994). ‘Understanding corporate coherence: Theory 
and evidence’, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 1-30. 
 Teece. D., Pisano, G., and Shuen, A. (1990), ‘Firm capabilities, resources, and the concept of strategy’, 
CCC Working Paper 90-8, Center for Research on Management. University of California, Berkeley. 
 Vernon, R. (1966), ‘International investment and international trade in the product life cycle”, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 80, No. 2, pp. 190-207. 
 Williamson, J. (1990) ‘What Washington means by policy reform’, in Williamson, J. (ed.): Latin 
American Readjustment: How Much has Happened, Washington: Institute for International 
Economics. 
 World Bank (1993), The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy, NY: Oxford 
University Press. 
 Yin, R. (2009), Case Study Research: Design and Methods, (4th ed.), Thousand Oaks: Sage 
Publishing. 
